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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: "OF NOZICK, RAWLS
AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JURISPRUDENCE"
Menaka Guruswamy*
The quest for justice has been as challenging as the quest for the Holy Grail and
as elusive .. J
To some the above is true because justice is a will-o-the-wisp, to others
because it is too vast to be encompassed by one mind. Aristotle's pioneering analysis
still serves as a crucible into which even modern craftsmen continue to pour the
problems of the 20th Century in the hope that an acceptable brew will emerge. In
dealing with particular justice as distinct from universal justice, Aristotle distinguished between distributive and corrective justice.2
Distributive justice, according to Aristotle, is exercised in the distribution of
honour, wealth and other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted
among its members in equal or unequal shares. In today' s world it would mean equal
distribution among equals.3
The Aristotelian principle suffers from certain weaknesses. Chief amongst
these, are: who is to decide what is equal; and how is one to decide upon relevant
similarities amongst equals. These issues capture Hart's had thus very same problem
with the Arist,)telian formula of distributive justice. Hart follows Aristotle in
locating the lir,k between law and morality in the concepts of equality, of treating
alike things th:lt are alike and treating differently things that are different.4
However, according to Hart, where distributive justice was concerned
maxim does not take one far. Hart opined that "any set of human beings
resemble each other in some respects and differ from each others in others and
it is established what resemblance and differences are relevant; treat like cases
must remain an empty form."5

*

this
will
until
alike

V Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University.

I

R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence

2

Also see, C. Huntington,

65 (1994).

Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel 122 (1980).

3

Dias, supra n. 1.

4

J.M. Kelly, Short History on Western Legal Thought 413 (1990).

5

Compare this with the Indian constitutional law jurisprudence pertaining to the 'tests of valid
classification':
Wherefore in order to pass the test of permissible classification (I) the classification
must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) the differentia must have a rational
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The criteria of relevant resemblances and differences may often vary with the
fundamental moral outlook of a given person or society in any given time. Therefore
given this problem, Hart suggests that legislation for distributive justice must: (1)
have a general purpose specified; and (2) claims of all different competing interests
likely to be affected should be impartially considered.
Indian constitutional jurisprudence with the doctrine of equality and the
classification principle, as formulated by our Supreme Court seems to have dispelled
Hart's worries.
Interestingly, the apex court has put forth what it believes is the essence of
distributive justice. In Gurbax Singh v. Finance Commissioner,6 the court opined
that relative equality in treating different persons while granting relief according to
need or reward; and punishment according to merit and guilt is the essence of
distributive justice. The court further declared that distributive justice presupposes
equality of rights, equal capacity to act and equal status. The Supreme Court cited
Randbruch who said that distributive justice is the prototype of justice, in which the
concept of law must be oriented towards the idea of justice. The law must offer and
protect the conditions necessary for the life of man and his perfection.
Earlier a constitutional bench of the apex court in Minerva Mills and others
v. Union of India? through Justice Chandrachud seemed to echo the Rawlesian brand
of justice, with reference to Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State
Policy.8
"These fundamental rights are not an end in themselves but are the means to
an end", according to the learned Judge. He elaborated that the "end is specified in
Part IV.9 Therefore the rights conferred in Part mlO are subject to reasonable
restriction."
This discourse by the judge seems to epitomize the direction chosen by the
Supreme Court in terms of interpreting the Constitution. Jurisprudentially this form
of a welfare doctrine falls within the category of a 'means or basic needs' model of
the philosophy of distributive justice.ll

relation to the object sought to be achieved by statute in question - laid down in State of W.B. v.
Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 se 75; reaffirmed in Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984)
1 see 222, 229; Prabodh Verma v. State of V.P., (1984) 4 see 251; Raj Pal Sharma v. State of
Haryana. 1985 Supp. see 72, 75.
6
7

1991 Supp (1) see 167 at 177; AIR 1991 se 435.
AIR 1980 se 1789.

8

Ibid. at para. 62.

9

Part III deals with the Fundamental Rights.

10 Part IV deals with the Directive Principles of State Policy.
11 Dias, supra n. 1 at 67.
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This will be focussed upon, using the philosophies of Robert Nozick and John
Rawls as two ends of a realistic barometer of politico-legalistic choice (by both the
judiciary and policy makers) which transcends into the economic sphere naturally.12
Indian Constitutional jurisprudence with reference to distributive justice has
been compared with John Rawls' and Robert Nozick's views on the same. This has
been .done due to specific reasons. It is understood that with the acceptance and
practice of the New Economic Policy the policy makers have chosen the free market
economy model to achieve the ideals of our Constitution. Both Rawls' and Nozick's
philosophies espoused different frameworks of free market economies and capitalist
societies.
Whereas, Rawls presented a 'softer' version of capitalism with some semblance of social welfare, Nozick (whose philosophy was a reaction to Rawls)
believed in minimal state interference - essentially the "minimal night watchman
state" with no welfarian intervention.
This article suggests that with the acceptance of the dictates of the International
Monetary Fund and W orId Bank the policy makers seem to have chosen the RawlsNozick structures. The important point to remember is that like Rawls and Nozick,
other market oriented philosophies too justify and espouse their causes on grounds
of greater liberty and freedom of individuals.
This article firstly endeavours to prove the incompatibility of Rawls, Nozick
and the New Economic Policy with Indian Constitutional jurisprudence. Secondly,
the article explores the flaws in the distributive justice views of Rawls and Nozick
on justice. Thirdly, Rawlesian and Nozikian jurisprudence is compared with that of
the Indian Sup"eme Court with reference to Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles of State Policy. And eventually the article hopes to highlight the movement away from even the Rawlesian version of capitalism to the Nozikian minimal
night watchman state, therefore leaving the distributive justice ideals of the Constitution far behind.
PROBLEMS

WITH SCHEMES

OF DISTRIBUTION

Two primary problems with schemes of distribution can be identified. The first
difficulty of securing acceptance of a scheme of allocation, and even more so, of
keeping it acceptable, arises from the fact that the sense of injustice is a capricious
sentiment,13 which is likely to be changed, by the distribution that exists. For
instance, the welfare state attempts to satisfy 'basic needs'. The word 'basic' implies
that over and above certain minima, it is open to some people to enjoy additional
amenities, so that there will continue to be 'haves' and 'have nots'. The tendency

12 See, P. Hammond, The Economics of Justice and the Criterion of Wealth Maximization, 91 Yale
LJ. 1493 (1982).
13 See, J. Shklar, Giving Injustice its Due.98 Yale L.J. 1135 (1989).
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sooner or later will be for the latter to start insisting that some of the things which
they would like, but do not have, are 'basic' and hence 'needs' and due 'as of right'.
As Professor Honore has observed, "What is at one time a luxury becomes at another
time a necessity and need".14
Another difficulty· in the way of winning and preserving acceptance of a
scheme of distribution is the need to have confidence in those who decide what are
basic needs, how advantages and disadvantages are to be distributed and when they
are deemed to be satisfied. The people who decide these matters have to be invested
with power, and the problem then is one of curbing the abuse of power.
RA WLESIAN

BRAND

OF JUSTICE

John Rawls in his book 'ATheory
justice:15

of Justice' initially states two principles of

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be managed so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all.
To put it another way: Rawls declared that all social values - liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these values is to everyone's
advantage.
BACKGROUND

INSTITUTIONS

FOR DISTRIBUTIVE

JUSTICE

The main problem according to Rawls of distributive justice is the choice of
a social system.16 The idea of justice as fairness is to use the notion of pure
procedural justice to handle the contingencies of particular situations.
Rawls commences upon expounding on the background institutions for distributive justice by assuming that the basic structure is regulated by ajust Constitution
that secures the liberties of equal citizenship. I? Liberty of conscience and freedom
of thought are taken for granted,·and the fair value of political liberty is maintained.
He also assumes that there is fair equality of opportunity. For example, the
government tries to ensure equal chances of education for persons similarly endowed
14 Dias, supra n. 1 at 67.
15 Rawls, The Theory of Justice 60 (1971). Compare these two principles of justice with decision of
Supreme Court in Minerva Mills and Others v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789. This will be
dealt with later.
16 Ibid. at 274.
17 Ibid. at 275.
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and motivated either by subsidizing private schools or by establishing a public
school system. It also enforces and underwrites equality of opportunity in economic
activities and in the free choice of occupation. This is achieved by policing the
conduct of firms and in the private associations and by preventing the establishment
of monopolistic restrictions and carriers to the more desirable positions. Finally the
government guarantees a social minimum either by family allowances and special
payments for sickness and unemployment, or more systematically by taxation
devices.18
In establishing the background institutions, the government may be thought of
as divided into four branches. Each branch consists of various agencies and activities
thereof, changed with preserving certain social and economic conditions. These
divisions do not overlap with the usual organization of government, but are to be
understood as different functions.
The allocation branch under Rawls framework keeps the price system work ably
competitive- and prevents the formation of unreasonable market power.19 The
allocation branch is also charged with identifying and correcting say by suitable
taxes and subsidies and by changes in the definition of property rights,20 the more
obvious departures from efficiency caused by the failure of prices to measure
accurately social benefits and costs. To this end suitable taxes and subsidies21 may
be used or the scope and definition of property rights may be revised.
The transfer branch takes 'needs' into account, and assigns them an appropriate
weight with respect to other claims.23 A competitive price system gives no consideration to needs. The stabilisation branch, strives to bring about reasonably full
employment, in the sense that those who want to work can find it.
The distributive branch preserves an approximate justice in distributive shares
by means of taxation.24 Two aspects of this branch may be distinguished. First of
all, a number of inheritance and gift taxes are imposed, and restrictions are set on
bequests. The purpose of these levies and regulations is to gradually and continually
correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power. The second
part of this distributive branch is a scheme of taxation to raise revenues that justice
requires.

18 Ibid. at 275. For example in India we follow the model of the progressive taxation,
income one earns, the more one is taxed. Refer to the Income Tax Act, 1961.

the more

19 Ibid. at 276.
20 Id. See for example the Monopolies

and Restrictive

Trade Act.

21

The change in the character of the Right to Property from a Fundamental
Art. 19(1)(f) to a legal right under Art. 300-A of the Constitution.

22

Subsidies which are provided for small scale industries or cottage industries,
taxation of agricultural lands.

23 Rawls, supra n. 15 at 276.
24 Ibid. at 277.

Right under the erstwhile
the exemption

from
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PHILOSOPHY

Nozick starts from the unargued premise that individuals have certain inviolable rights which may not be transgressed intentionally by other individuals or the
state for any purpose. He concludes that the only morally permissible state is the
minimal night watchman state, a state limited to protecting people against murder,
assault, theft, fraud and breach of contract,25
Nozick believed that
whatever he/she can make,
or with plain luck. Nozick
may be overridden merely
NOZlCK

each person is entitled to his talents and abilities, and to
get 01' buy with his/her own efforts with the help of others
denies that any of the rights (like the right to property)
to do good or prevent evi1.26

ON DISTRIBUTIVE

JUSTICE

Nozick defines an historical principle as one which asserts that the justice of
a distribution depends on how it carne about, and an end result principle as one which
denies Illis. He opined that a patterned principle is one which specifies that a
distribution is to vary along some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural
dimensions, or lexico graphic ordering of natural dimensions. His own theory, the
entitlement theory is easy to describe in these terms. It is a non-patterned historical
principle, for it specifies that any distribution is just if it was arrived at by a series
of individual transactions among people entitled by natural rights of acquisition and
transfer to make them. Robert Nozick felt that any patterned system of distribution
would require interference with individual liberty.
He erroneously interprets the notion of a patterned principle as specifying a
distribution of absolute entitlements of wealth or property. But absolute entitlement
to property are not what would be allocated to people under a partially egalitarian
distribution. Possession would confer the kind of qualified entitlement that exists in
a system under which taxes and other conditions are managed to preserve certain
features of distribution, while permitting choice, use and exchange of property
compatible with it.
.
Nozick argues that an attempt to maintain an equal or near equal distribution
of resources will demand constant interference with liberty.27 It is not only the strict
egalitarian who in Nozick's view will have to embark on such constant interference
with liberty, the same applies to anyone who holds what Nozick calls a patterned

25 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
26 Compare this to the choice made in India whereby Art. 19(1)(t) the Right to Property was deleted
from the Constitution in 1979. The erstwhile 'Fundamental Right to Property' is now only a 'Legal
Right' as provided under Art. 300-A of our Constitution. See, N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Intellectual
Property and Criminal Law, (1994), for an excellent discussion (in Chapter II of the book) on the
institution of property and the Constitution.
27 Nagel, Libertarianism without Foundation, 85 Yale LJ. 136 (1975) at 138.
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conception of justice.28 A "pattemed" conception of justice views justice as a matter
of tile pallem of distribution which is achieved.29
Thus "distribution according to need", "distribution according to intelligence"
and equal distribution would all be pattemed conceptions of justice: iliey judge ilie
justice of a situation by where ilie resources end up.30
RA WLESIAN PHIWSOPHY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE:
'THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLlCy,J1
Article 37 of ilie Constitution provides tilat Directive Principles of State Policy
are fundamental in lie govemance of ilie country and tl1at it is tl1c duty of tl1e state
LO apply tilese principles
in making laws.
The state is to strive for social, economic and political justice, and must
minimize ilie inequalities in income and statuS.32 The state is obliged to eliminate
inequalities in opportunity.33 Rawls provides for facilitating equality of opportunity
by setting up a state schooling system for tilose who cannot afford education.34 But
whereas tl1e Directive Principles speak of tl1e state making an effort to minimize
inequality in income and status, Rawls permits tl1e existence of inequalities in
income and wealli, if tl1is unequal distribution benefits tl1e least advantaged. For
example tl1e disparity in income between tl1e Chief Executive Officer and Banking
Attendant is permissible, as long as it facilitates a certain wage for ilie latter i.e., his
or her wage would be less, if one tried to equalise incomes.35
Article 39 mandates iliat the citizens must have tl1eright to an adequate means
of livelihood. This adequate means of livelihood is necessary to satisfy basic needs
and to live life witl1 tl1e dignity envisaged by tl1e case law under Art. 21.36
Rawls speaks of a social minimum being ilie responsibility of ilie Transfer
Branch. This is because as Rawls opined iliat a competitive price system gives no
consideration to needs and tl1erefore cannot be tl1e sole device of distribution.3?

28

Nozick, supra n. 25 at 153.

29 Id.
30 See generally,

N.E. Simmonds,

Central Issues in Jurisprudence

53-61 (1986).

31

Hereinafter

referred to as DPSP.

32

Art. 38(2).

33

Art. 41 provides

34

1. Rawls, Theory of Justice 275 (1971).

35

Art. 21 protects life and liberty. In Francis Coralie 1'. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 se 746,
Justice Bhagwati spoke of the right to live with human dignity satisfying the bare necessities.

36

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal

37

Rawls, supra II. 34 at 275.

that the state must facilitate

Corporation,

education.

(1985) 3

see

545.
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Rawls' Stabilisation Branch takes care of the process of bringing about full
employment or reasonably full-employment for those who want to work (to ensure
adequate means of livelihood). 38 The Indian Constitution provides that the state must
within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work.39
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN RA WLESIAN
AND DPSP JURISPRUDENCE

PHILOSOPHY

In many ways Rawls' work was also an attempt at presenting a more humane,
(if somewhat forced) face of capitalism. Yet Rawls' attempts to find ways to justify
the often disgusting disparity between the incomes of Chief Executive Officers of
Companies and management on one side and workers on the other side. The Indian
Constitution however states that the state should endeavour to ensure participation
of workers in the management of undertakings and establishments. Rawls at no stage
espouses workers' participation in management or ownership of industrial undertakings. He maintains the strict divide between the owners and workers.
Art. 46 of the Constitution declares that the state must promote with special
care the educational and economic interests of Ole weaker sections of the people in
particular Ole Scheduled Castes and Tribes. This was enforced by the Apex Court
in State of Madras v. ChampakamDorairajan.4o Rawls provided that only those who
were SIMILARLY ENDOWED AND MOnV ATED would have the benefit of
subsidized education implying that the only disadvantage which Rawls sought to
remedy was economic disparity, the factum of not being able to afford education,
all other things like merit etc., being equa1.41
The Constitution and the Supreme Court through a policy of reservation and
subsiding education, reserves seats for historically and culturally disadvantaged
groups like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.42 The policy of providing seats
in educational institutions for members of backward communities, even if merit is
unequal is followed in India. So Rawls' policy of SIMILARLY ENDOWED has not
been accepted by Indian Constitutional jurisprudence. This reservation extends to
public employment opportunities also.43

38

Rawls, supra n. 15 at 278.

39

Art. 41 of the Constitution.

40

AIR 1951 SC 226.

41

Rawls, supra n. 15.

42

See I. Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477. See, Singh, Indra Sawhney v. Union of India:

A Review, 5 Student Advocate 72 (1993).
43

Arts. 16(3) and (4) of the Constitution.
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Nozick denies that any rights of the individual can be overridden merely to do
good or prevent evil. His theory is based upon the distinctness of persons and
therefore rejects the philosophy of utilitarianism which is based upon the pain or
pleasure of the majority or maximum number.
In Indian Constitutional jurisprudence, though Fundamental Rights are per se
for safeguarding the rights of citizens individually, there may be restrictions for
purposes of public interest and other grounds.
Art. 14 which provides for equal protection before law, operates on the
distinctness of classes, but looks to the similarities amidst the members of the same
class. This classification under Art. 14 is for purposes of legislation. This must be
distinguished from the Nozickian paradigm where the legislation must reflect the
distinctness of each individual and safeguard this individualistic distinctness. In the
Nozickian framework each citizen has a right only upon himself or herself whereas
the constitutional philosophy not only takes into account (1) others rights (as
opposed to the individual) (2) but restricts those rights for the 'others' (for the benefit
of society).44
It is also pertinent to note here, that whereas the intention or object behind the
passage of all legislation in the ideal Nozick society is to facilitate unrestricted
exercise of individualliberty,45 this is not the case for legislations within the Indian
Constitutional framework.
All the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India; those
of equality,46 prohibition against discrimination,47 equality of opportunity48 in
matters of public employment, speech and expression,49 occupation, 50 movement, 51
association,52 personal liberty,53 religion54 etc., are all subject to public interest,
morality, societal interest etc.

44 See, D.D. Basu, Hunu11l Rights in Constitutional
Rights as a Limitation' ..
45 See generaLly, Simmonds,
46

Art. 14.

47

Art. 15.

48

Article 16.

49

Art. 19(1)(a).

50

Art. 19( 1)(g).

51

Art. 19(1)(d).

52

Art. 19(1)(c).

53

Art. 21.

54

Art. 25.

supra n. 30.

Law, (1994) - for an analysis of 'Fundamental
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Nozick concluded that the only morally permissible state is the minimal night
watchman state, a state limited to protecting people against murder, assault, theft,
fraud and breach of contract. The Indian Constitution utilizes law as an instrument
not only to protect rights, but to facilitate welfarian intervention by the state. In fact,
many rights operate within and against the state, unlike Nozick's paradigm, of rights
and laws merely to regulate interaction amidst individuals only.
Nozick despised 'state power' stating that it was used to murder, torture,
censor, imprison political opponents etc.55 The Constitutional mandate is a welfare
state; and recognises the 'good' which the state can do and espouses intervention
by state for public good. The Constitution prefers the 'maximum state philosophy',
to facilitate Distributive Justice.
CONCLUSION:
BAROMETER

THE NEW ECONOMIC

POLICY ... THE RA WLS-NOZICK

As India moves towards the 'Global Village' ideal with the acceptance and
practice of the liberalisation policy, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over the model of
'distributive justice' evolved by our courts.
It is believed that liberalisation has multiple consequences on the domestic
front; sharpening unemployment, eliminating indigenous industrial sector, slowly
degrading the eco-system and appropriating natural resources.56
Nozick put forth his brand of justice which mandated virtually no state
intervention in econ()mic transactions. The market system was to be the only judge
and arbiter of transactions. Nozick's theory ignores considerations such as class,
caste barriers which are equally influential in the Agrarian and Rural Economy
sector in India.57
Nozick's implicit assumption of a society devoid of "other" factors which
infringe the criterion of personal ability and merit being the qualification of success
and growth (renders his theory somewhat invalid in a country like India, where the
biggest struggle has been for the eradication of these "other" factors.
Yet the New Economic Policy seems to be a movement away from Rawls
towards Nozick.58 This new policy would like to reduce the role of the institutions
55

Nozick, supra n. 25

56

M. Assadi, Attack on Multiootionals,

3 EPW 464 (1996). Also see, M.H. Suryanarayan,

Reforms, Nature and Poverty, 31 EPW 617 (1996) and E. Noronha, Liberalization
Relations, 31 EPW 114 (1996).

Economic

and Industrial

57 See K. Basu, Methodological individualism, 31 EPW 269 (1996) - Where the author speaks of price
in a competitive model being an irreducible social concept. Each individual takes the price to be
given, but the price that comes to prevail is an outcome of a choice of collectivity e.g., the landlord
will undertake an action like refusing to hire a servant who fled another landlords' employment
and offers to work for a low wage, since this would hurt the interest of the landlord class.
58 Taking Rawls and Nozick as two extremes on the economic barometer.
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of distributive justice put together by the Indian state since independence. So far the
jurisprudence evolved by our courts have placed some 'burdens' on Fundamental
Rights.59 This was so as to facilitate the distributive justice model spoken of earlier.
It is fascinating to note that even in countries like Singapore and Japan (Asian
power houses), economic growth resulted only after their respective governments
infringed60 the personal liberties and freedoms which Nozick emphasized. Nozick's
assumption that economic growth is directly proportional to liberty seems unfounded.
Undoubtedly the real question is trying to find a balance. It needs to be
labouring that China and Korea have performed well with a great deal of government
intervention. The distinction however does seem to be that Nozick bases his model
of complete freedom in economi,c transaction on the fact that liberty is an inviolable
right. Rawls, on the other hand, divides this concept of basic inviolable rights into
two levels - those that are absolute and those can be infringed for the good of the
least advantaged.
With India following the IMF dictates, the least advantaged, which in this
country are the substantial number of Indian citizens who are below the poverty line,
are forgotten in the chase of the elusive "absolute market will decide mechanism".
The Constitutional jurisprudence so (beautifully?) evolved by the judiciary - of a
welfarian state might have to change course in order to give expression to the policy
espoused by the government.
For now it seems a movement towards Nozick and away from Rawls.

59 See M. Dori, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L.R. 1175 (1996).
60 See, K.N. Kabra, ww Down on East Asian Growth, 31 EPW 596 (1996).
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